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ABSTRACT
Peer recognition systems are an increasingly popular management control tool
through which employees can recognize and thank other employees. While these systems
have potential to motivate firm desired behaviors, including behaviors that are
unobservable by management, little is known about if, or when, they are effective. Using
a laboratory experiment, I examine the effectiveness of these systems in motivating
employee helping behavior, both when the system includes rewards and when it does not.
While I document that helping behavior is generally greater when peer recognition
systems are present, I also document that group affiliation is a key moderating factor in
determining the effectiveness of these systems. Specifically, I find that peer recognition
systems are more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group helping. Conversely,
I also find that the incremental benefit of adding rewards to a peer recognition system is
greater for out-group versus in-group helping. Theoretical and practical implications for
peer recognition system design are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This study provides an initial examination of the motivational effects of peer
recognition systems as well as insight into when providing reward incentives in
conjunction with those systems is likely to be most beneficial. Many firms including
Intuit, Intel, Zappos, and Google have implemented peer recognition systems that allow
employees to recognize other employees in the firm for their help and accomplishments
(Irvine, 2012; Jones, 2015; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). Despite their growing
popularity in practice and in the business press (e.g., Globoforce, 2008; Gorman, 2014;
Irvine, 2012; Jones, 2015), there is little research addressing peer recognition systems and
how they work. Using a laboratory experiment, I examine how the presence, and type, of
peer recognition system effects employees’ beliefs, team identities, and most importantly
actions.
Peer recognition is recognition of one’s individual contribution sent directly from
one employee to another employee (at the same or similar organizational level), at the
sending employee’s discretion. Peer recognition systems are a type of control system that
encourage employees to acknowledge peers for positive individual behaviors. Given their
responsibility for the design of the incentive and control system (Bonner & Sprinkle,
2002), management accountants can benefit from greater insight into the effectiveness of
peer recognition systems.
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While firms likely wish to capture multiple benefits from implementing peer
recognition systems (e.g., helping behavior, better individual performance, employee
satisfaction, reduced turnover, etc.), in this study I focus on how these systems affect
helping behavior. Often firm outcomes are dependent on various individuals or
departments supporting one another’s efforts to achieve their individual objectives, yet
such helping behavior can be difficult to motivate using traditional incentives because it
is difficult for management to observe (Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast,
1999; Sprinkle, 2003). Because peer employees can often observe what management
cannot, peer recognition systems may provide a unique opportunity to motivate helping
behavior.
A choice firms face when considering the implementation of a peer recognition
system is whether or not to sponsor rewards to be given along with the peer recognition.
While one might assume that adding rewards would provide additional motivation, prior
research on incentives and social preferences (e.g., Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012;
Lourenço, 2015) suggests that the likely effect may be more nuanced. Further, although
including rewards is a common feature of a number of peer recognition programs in
practice (Irvine, 2012; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012), research has yet to establish
if, or when, the inclusion of rewards provides incremental motivation. The purpose of this
paper is to provide insight into (1) whether peer recognition systems are effective in
motivating employees to help others in the firm, (2) when peer recognition systems
(absent rewards) might be more or less effective, and (3) when there is an incremental
benefit of tying rewards to peer recognition.
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Given the peer nature of peer recognition, employees’ social ties or group
affiliations are likely to have important implications for how effective these systems are
in motivating helping behavior. Further, in many settings, the firm can benefit when
employees help both within their own groups and across groups (e.g., teams,
departments, business units, etc.). It is possible, however, that interventions which will
motivate employees to help a member of their own group (i.e., in-group) might not
motivate them to help a member of another group (i.e., out-group), and vice versa. As
such, different design features of a peer recognition system may be more or less effective
depending upon the group affiliation of employees.
I predict that the presence of a peer recognition system will generally motivate
increased helping behavior. I further predict that employees’ group affiliation will
moderate the effectiveness of peer recognition systems (absent rewards). I form this
prediction based on findings from social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1990), which
suggest that individuals are more willing to help others when a shared identity is salient
to them (De Cremer & Van Vugt 1998; Kramer & Brewer, 1984). I expect the presence
of a peer recognition system to create a setting that makes salient the team identity shared
by in-group (but not out-group) members, leading these systems to be more effective in
motivating in-group versus out-group helping behavior.
Conversely, I also predict that there will be a greater benefit from tying rewards to
peer recognition in settings where helping is more out-group than in-group. This is
because, while prior research suggests that incentives typically strengthen motivation, it
also suggests that incentives can crowd out or substitute for, rather than add to the
motivational effects derived from other types of motivators (e.g., intrinsic or social)
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(Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Lourenço, 2015). Because I expect
the degree of social motivation to be lesser for the out-group versus the in-group, I also
expect substitution effects will be less relevant for the out-group versus the in-group. As
a result, I expect that adding rewards to peer recognition systems will be more beneficial
for out-group versus in-group helping.
I use a laboratory experiment to test my predictions. Participants are paid a fixed
wage for working on a data entry task for six minutes and are then allowed to choose how
much of an additional four minutes they wish to spend working on the task to help
another participant versus working for their own gain. Time spent working for
themselves earns them an additional piece-rate per entry they complete. Participants also
know that time spent working to help someone else earns that participant additional pay.
This creates a setting where participants must make a costly sacrifice of time (which
represents forgone earnings) in order to help another participant. I manipulate group
affiliation as either “in-group” or “out-group,” by assigning participants to color groups
when they enter the laboratory and then creating a helping opportunity either for a
participant from their own color group (in-group) or for a participant from a different
color group (out-group). I manipulate the peer recognition system as either absent,
present, or present with a reward. In the peer recognition with rewards condition,
participants know that if they are recognized, in addition to receiving the recognition
message, they will have the opportunity to choose a small reward at the end of the
experiment.
My experimental findings are consistent with my predictions. When comparing
the presence versus absence of a peer recognition system (i.e., without regard for other
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moderating variables), I find that peer recognition systems generally lead to an increase
in the amount of time participants spend helping others, and that participants’
expectations of receiving help mediates this effect. Further, when I split by condition, I
find an interaction between group affiliation and the presence versus absence of a peer
recognition system suggesting that when no rewards are present, peer recognition systems
are more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group helping behavior. Conversely,
I also find an interaction between group affiliation and the presence versus absence of
rewards within the peer recognition system, suggesting that adding rewards is more
motivating among out-group versus in-group members.
The Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) defines the role of management
accountants to include, “devising…performance management systems, and providing
expertise in … control to formulate and implement an organization’s strategy” (IMA,
2019). Peer recognition systems are a unique type of control, which are likely to motivate
greater helping behavior both directly and indirectly via their impact on company culture
(Jones, 2015; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Peer recognition systems bear
similarities to mutual monitoring systems, only in peer recognition systems employees
are asked to acknowledge peers for their positive individual behaviors as opposed to
report peers’ negative behaviors to management. My study provides an initial
examination of the motivational effects of peer recognition systems and the addition of
rewards to them. As such, my findings will be of interest to management accountants
who have responsibility over compensation, incentive, and control system design.
My study also extends an emerging body of literature on recognition (e.g., Bradler
et al., 2014; Burke, 2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017), and introduces peer
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recognition as an important source through which recognition may come. I document that
peer recognition systems are effective in motivating helping behavior, which prior work
has suggested can be difficult to accomplish using traditional incentives due to the
difficulty of observing such behaviors (Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Prendergast,
1999; Sprinkle, 2003). Further, I document that group affiliation influences the
effectiveness of peer recognition systems both when rewards are included and when they
are not.
While firms will also want to consider costs associated with implementing peer
recognition systems, my study provides insights into the potential benefits. My results
suggest that firms wishing to motivate greater helping behavior when group affiliation is
uncertain or unstable (e.g., across departments or workgroups) would likely do well to tie
rewards to peer recognition systems. Alternatively, my results suggest that if a firm is
able to strengthen the degree to which employees view themselves as being a part of the
same group (e.g., via social events, team building activities, etc.) then they may be able to
benefit significantly from a peer recognition system without incurring any additional
costs of providing rewards.

6

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Background and setting: peer recognition systems
As part of an effort to find more innovative ways to motivate employees, many
companies have implemented formal recognition programs, a number of which include
peer recognition as a key component (Globoforce, 2008; Gorman, 2014; Irvine, 2012;
Jones, 2015; Nohria et al., 2008; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). While employees
usually have opportunities to informally recognize one another (e.g., simply say, “thank
you” or “great job” outside of any formal system), the fact that firms are also
implementing formal peer recognition systems suggests that they are dissatisfied with the
extent to which such informal recognition is happening, or perhaps are hoping to garner
more of the motivational potential of peer recognition.1 Emerging companies are also
specializing in helping firms recognize and reward employees, including developing
customized online platforms for that purpose (e.g., Globoforce and Motivosity).
Many peer recognition programs also allow employees to send company
sponsored rewards of modest value in conjunction with recognition (Irvine, 2012; Quinn,
2018; Zappos Insights, 2012). Often these rewards can be sent with minimal management

1

For example, relative to informal peer recognition, formal peer recognition systems
could lead to more peer recognition, make the peer recognition more impactful, or both.
While I do not study informal peer recognition, I acknowledge that the effects of formal
systems that I document could be moderated depending on how effective the informal
recognition culture of a company already is. I discuss this more in section V.
7

oversight (e.g., the manager may receive a carbon copy of the recognition message, but
require no direct approval). A common way rewards are administered is through dollars
or points that then must be redeemed for gift cards or other tangible rewards (Globoforce,
2008; Motivosity, 2019; Zappos Insights, 2012). For example, at Intuit, employees can
use an online recognition platform to write a recognition message and select from a range
of cash values (e.g. $0, $10, $25, or $50) to send to another employee.2 The receiving
employee can then use the same system to redeem the rewards for gift cards of their
choice (Globoforce, 2008). Total monetary values of peer rewards relative to employee
salaries are usually comparatively small. Thus, rewards associated with peer recognition
typically provide “fun money” as opposed to significantly increasing employees’ income
(Kelly et al., 2017; Presslee et al., 2013; Quinn, 2018).3 Using relatively small rewards
may further act as a control; reducing the incentive for employees to collude to mutually
reward one another so as to inflate each other’s income (e.g., Evans et al., 2016).
An important aspect of peer recognition systems is their potential to motivate
helping across departments and skillsets (e.g., Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012).
Often firm outcomes are dependent on various individuals or departments supporting one
another’s efforts to achieve their individual objectives. For example, other departments
often rely on employees from the IT department to help them with their technical needs.
While helping other departments would likely be part of an IT employee’s job

2

Although in practice, employees can sometimes choose from a range of possible reward
amounts, in the present study I only address the presence versus absence of rewards
associated with peer recognition and not variation in the value of the reward.
3
Prior research has considered the effects of providing tangible versus cash rewards on
employee motivation (Kelly et al., 2017; Presslee et al., 2013). In this study, I hold
reward type constant, as a tangible reward, and vary whether a reward is present or not in
conjunction with peer recognition.
8

description, it may be difficult for the IT manager to directly reward an employee for
timely, quality service to other departments due to the difficulty of observing every
individual interaction of that employee. As another example, an individual may have
knowledge or skills that, if shared, might improve the outcome of a team member’s
assignment on a group project. In such cases, a peer recognition system gives employees
the ability to directly recognize and reward others who may help them, leading to better
results for those receiving help and for the company as a whole.
Peer recognition is different from peer evaluation. Under peer evaluation, peers
provide positive or negative feedback about another employee to the manager. Peer
recognition on the other hand is exclusively positive in nature and is often sent directly to
the recipient, although managers are frequently made aware of the recognition as well.4 A
growing body of research has also begun to consider the effects of recognition from a
manager on employees’ motivation to complete their work (Bradler et al., 2014; Burke,
2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017). Whereas recognition from a manager is vertical in
nature, peer recognition is typically horizontal in nature. Research on manager provided
recognition has also considered the effect of making relative performance recognition or
information publicly available to an employee’s co-workers versus privately conveyed to
a particular employee (Burke, 2019; Tafkov, 2013; Wang, 2017). In practice, peer

4

In practice, variation exists both in how salient peer recognition is to management and
in how salient it is to employees that management may be aware of their recognition. In
the present study, I develop theory regarding the effect of a peer recognition system in a
setting where management does not play a role. I make this choice to cleanly test the
effect of the peer recognition system without the potential confounding effect of
management’s awareness of the peer recognition. While it is possible that the presence of
a manager could moderate (or potentially enhance) certain aspects of my findings,
generally I would expect that my theory should extend to settings where managers are
also aware of the peer recognition.
9

provided recognition may also be public or private in nature. In this study, I focus on
private peer recognition. Any potential influence of using public peer recognition rather
than private peer recognition is beyond the scope of this study.
My study speaks to settings in which a peer recognition system supports
employees directly recognizing peers: both those seen as being part of one’s own group
and those viewed as part of a different group.5 In such settings, employees can recognize
co-workers for their help and other accomplishments. Helping is usually costly to the
helper however, as they might have otherwise used the time they spend helping to engage
in some other activity, such as leisure, or working more for themselves (which may
increase their own pay, bonus eligibility, future promotion potential, etc.). I also assume a
setting in which the potential recipient of help needs/benefits from help (even though it
may not be directly solicited6) and the firm always benefits when help is given. Although
in practice, there is likely a firm specific “optimal balance” of helping others versus
completing one’s own work, the fact that many firms are implementing peer recognition
systems suggest that these firms believe that more help would benefit them, and thus I
make a simplifying assumption that more help is better.

Many different types of “groups” exist in practice. For example, employees from
different departments, teams, and training backgrounds might all perceive themselves as
being from different groups. Importantly, my theory is intended to generalize to any
setting in which there exists a salient in-group or out-group connection/distinction
between the employee who could give help and the employee who could receive help.
6
In practice, there are many opportunities for helping even when it may not be directly
solicited. For example, employees may simply see a need they might fill, share useful
information others do not know they have, or prioritize their own work in order to help
others meet deadlines without being asked.
5
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Hypothesis development
Standard economic theory predicts that absent current or future monetary
incentives, individuals will withhold costly effort, including effort to help others
(Baiman, 1990; Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert, 2001; Prendergast, 1999). Behavioral
studies, however, have found that individuals are sometimes willing to help others, even
when it is costly (e.g., Black et al., 2019; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Newman et al., 2019).
Therefore, I assume as a baseline that, given an opportunity to help, some individuals will
do so even when current or future monetary incentives for doing so are absent. I now
outline theory predicting how peer recognition systems affect employees’ willingness to
exert costly effort to help others. I begin by discussing how a peer recognition system
may generally (i.e., without considering the group affiliation of employees or whether or
not rewards are tied to the recognition) affect beliefs about the likelihood of receiving
help and how this in turn influences willingness to give help.
I expect that, in many cases, the implementation of a formal peer recognition
system will signal to employees that the firm desires and supports helping behavior.
Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) find that controls directly influence people’s sense of what
behaviors are appropriate in a given situation, and consistent with this finding, I expect
peer recognition systems to signal to employees that the firm wants them to help others.
While this direct signaling may have some impact, I expect a greater effect to come as the
result of how the peer recognition system updates employee beliefs about the likelihood
of receiving help. Specifically, I consider how an individual’s anticipatory beliefs about
how they are likely to be treated in a particular situation, influences their current behavior
toward another who is not necessarily the same person who could help or hurt them.
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Direct reciprocity (i.e., the opportunity to directly reward or punish an individual
who helps or harms oneself) has been studied extensively and shown to have significant
effects on behavior, including enhancing individuals’ willingness to cooperate with
others (e.g., Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000a;
2000b; 2002). In this paper, however, I focus on the less studied role of indirect
reciprocity (i.e., reciprocity involving a third party) (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). More
specifically, how one’s expectations regarding whether someone is likely to help them
influences his/her own helping behavior toward a different individual. In so doing, I study
how peer recognition systems influence the perceived norms or “culture” of the firm
(Graham et al., 2019).7 Employee expectations regarding others’ helping behavior are
likely to influence their own helping behavior for at least two reasons. First, psychology
research suggests that people have strong preferences for behaving similarly to those
around them (Asch & Guetzkow, 1951; Cialdini et al., 1990; Sherif, 1936). Peer
recognition systems are likely to create a belief that others will engage in helping
behavior, and this belief is then likely to influence employees’ own helping behavior.
Second, as beliefs about general helping behavior go up, a natural implication is that the
individual themselves is more likely to be helped by others. If individuals believe that
they specifically are likely to be helped by someone else, then preferences for fairness
suggest that they will feel an obligation to also help others (i.e., if someone is likely to
help me, I should help someone else) (Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Sugden, 1984).

Note that I consider how peer recognition systems affect expectations regarding others’
(simultaneous) helping behavior in a single period setting. Thus, while what I study is
similar to a “norm,” I am cautious in using this term because no actual behavioral
consensus has developed.
7
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To summarize, I predict that a peer recognition system will influence employees’
beliefs about the likelihood of receiving help. As employees’ expectations of receiving
help go up, they will in turn feel a greater obligation to help others. Hypothesis 1a and
Hypothesis 1b are stated in alternate form as follows:
Hypothesis 1a: Employee helping behavior will be greater when a peer recognition
system is present than when it is absent.
Hypothesis 1b: Employee expectations of receiving help will mediate the relation
between peer recognition systems and employee helping behavior.

To this point, I have discussed the effect of the presence versus absence of a peer
recognition system on employee expectations and helping choices generally. I now take a
more nuanced view and consider how peer recognition systems may differentially affect
in-group versus out-group helping. I begin by discussing my predicted effects when the
peer recognition system does not include rewards.
Group affiliations are likely to have meaningful implications for helping behavior
in organizations. Organizations are often complex with multiple departments, divisions,
work teams, and other forms of “groups.” Such groups, though often necessary, may at
times present challenges in achieving the goals of the overall organization (Ashforth &
Meal, 1989; Brewer, 1979; Cilliers & Greyvenstein, 2012; Stone, 2004; Towry, 2003).
For example, members of various departments (e.g., accounting, marketing, engineering,
etc.) may opt to help members of their own department, while being more reluctant to
help members of other departments.
Social identity theory (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel & Turner,
1985) suggests that individuals self-categorize into groups and that their identification
with those groups affects the way they interact with others, both those from their own
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group (i.e., in-group), and those from other groups (i.e., out-groups). As individuals
identify with a group, there is a tendency to show in-group bias: favoring in-group
members, while possibly discriminating against out-group members (Brewer, 1979). A
number of studies find that individuals cooperate more in social dilemma settings when a
common group identity is salient to them (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1998; Kramer &
Brewer, 1984; Wit & Wilke, 1992). For example, De Cremer and Van Vugt (1998) find
that when a collective identity as opposed to a personal identity is made salient,
participants contributed more in a public goods game. Balliet et al. (2014) also find in a
meta-analysis that people are more cooperative with in-group versus out-group members.
In addition, research has found that group membership can influence auditor judgments
to be more likely to conform to perceived group norms (King, 2002). Together this
discussion suggests that the degree to which employees identify with others will likely
influence their willingness to help them.
The prior paragraph discussed findings suggesting that not only group
membership, but the salience or degree of identification with the group is predictive of
willingness to help. In forming a prediction regarding the effect of peer recognition
systems when employees share an in-group versus an out-group status, it is important to
highlight the potential for peer recognition systems to strengthen the sense of team
identity in-group members feel to one another, beyond any connection they may already
feel due to being part of the same group. Research suggests that social identities can be
made more or less salient depending on the setting and context (Hogg & Terry, 2000;
Oakes & Turner, 1990). When employees are already part of a group, I predict peer
recognition systems are likely to create a context that strengthens the connection in-group
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members feel to one another. The reason is that by encouraging peer recognition, these
systems implicitly suggest a group paradigm (i.e., that everyone should support each
other and is on the same team). This is likely to emphasize the team identity of group
members. As a result, I expect employees to feel a greater obligation to help those in their
group. Alternatively, out-group members do not share a pre-existing in-group status, and
as such, there is less of a team identity to emphasize. As a result, I expect peer
recognition systems to do less to motivate out-group helping.8
To summarize, I predict that the presence of a peer recognition system (which
does not include rewards) will motivate in-group helping to a greater degree than outgroup helping. Hypothesis 2 is formally stated in alternate form as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The increase in employee helping behavior caused by a peer recognition
system (absent rewards) will be greater when helping is in-group as opposed to
out-group.

I now turn my focus to the effect of adding rewards to a peer recognition system.
Research has found that monetary rewards (whether cash-based or tangible rewards with
monetary value) can motivate effort (Banker et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 2017; Lazear,
2000; Presslee et al., 2013; Shearer, 2004). However, research has also found that
monetary incentives and other types of motivation (e.g., intrinsic or social) are not always
additive in nature, but rather often are substitutes (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009; Bénabou &

8

Note that in the setting I consider, employees do not necessarily know who might be
able to help them (i.e., whether they are in-group or out-group). Employees only know
the group affiliation of those they could help. As such, while I use general expectations
of receiving help in developing my predictions for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, these
expectations should not theoretically differ based on employees’ knowledge of the group
affiliation of an individual they might help. Consequently, I do not use expectations of
receiving help, but rather feelings of team identity in developing predictions for
Hypotheses 2 and 3.
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Tirole, 2006; Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012; Deci, 1971; Frey & Jegen, 2001; Lourenço,
2015). For example, using a field experiment, Lourenço (2015) found a negative
interaction between monetary incentives and public recognition from management. Her
study suggests that these two act as substitutes that crowd out the motivational effects of
the other.
Consistent with this literature, I also expect that reward incentives and social
motivation9 will not be simply additive, but rather will act as substitutes. Importantly, I
expect that the degree to which this substitution effect will manifest depends on the group
affiliation of employees. If team identity is relatively weak (as I expect for out-group
members), then adding a reward should have a positive effect on overall motivation. If
team identity is relatively strong however (as I expect for in-group members), then it is
less clear what effect adding a reward will have on overall motivation because the reward
could substitute for (or crowd out) the social motivation derived from the sense of team
identity.10 As a result, I predict that adding rewards will be more beneficial for out-group
helping than in-group helping. Hypothesis 3 is formally stated in alternate form as
follows:
Hypothesis 3: Adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be more beneficial for
out-group helping than in-group helping.

I use the term “social motivation” here and elsewhere in the paper, to refer to
motivation that is derived from the social environment and is not caused by a reward. The
specific source of “social motivation” in my study is the team identity employees feel.
10
Note that my predicted substitution effect could result in in-group helping decreasing,
not changing (i.e., perfect substitutes), or increasing but to a lesser extent than if no
substitution were present. As such, I do not predict an absolute level difference for ingroup helping, but rather that adding rewards will be more beneficial for out-group than
in-group helping.
9
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Experimental design and task
I use a 2x2+2 nested design to test my hypotheses. I manipulate group affiliation
as either in-group or out-group, peer recognition system as either present or absent, and
within the peer recognition present condition also manipulate the presence of rewards
(leading to three total conditions related to peer recognition: no peer recognition, peer
recognition, and peer recognition with rewards). Experimental sessions are randomly
assigned to one of the three peer recognition conditions prior to running the experiment.
Group affiliation is manipulated within each session as described below. I run 12 sessions
with 16 participants each, resulting in 192 participants in total.11 I programmed the
experiment using Qualtrics, combined with Microsoft Power Automate to facilitate
personal interaction.
Participants complete a data entry task in which they have an abbreviated
customer listing and must identify and input the six-digit number of an indicated
customer. Participants input the customer number and then move to the next entry. More
entries can be accessed by scrolling down the page. All participants receive the same
entries, in the same order. See the appendix for an excerpt from the experimental
instructions explaining the task.

11

I obtained approval to run this study from my University’s Institutional Review Board.
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Participants first complete the task for six minutes (360 seconds) and are paid
$5.00 for their time. Participants then choose how much of an additional four minutes
(240 seconds) they will spend working for themselves versus working to help another
participant.12 The four minutes are allocated in one-minute (60 second) increments to
these two options. During the additional time participants spend working for themselves
they earn $0.05 for each correct entry they complete. Participants also know that during
the additional time they spend working to help another participant, that participant will
benefit from each entry they complete, however participants do not know precisely by
how much.13 Participants receive no direct financial benefit from helping. Thus,
allocating time to help is costly in that it requires participants to forgo additional pay they
could have earned if they had allocated the time to working more for themselves.14
Everyone knows that potential helpers will be kept anonymous unless help is
given. That is, if a participant chooses to help, then the participant receiving help is
subsequently told who helped them and how much they were helped. Alternatively, if no

12

For simplicity, in my setting participants do not request help, rather in the instructions,
I make it clear to all participants that the other participant will benefit from any help
given.
13
Participants earn $0.10 for each entry someone else completes to help them. However,
I refrain from telling participants the exact benefit from their help to reduce the likelihood
that participants focus on economic payouts when making their helping choices. This
design choice reflects many settings in practice, where employees do not know precisely
how much someone else might benefit from their help.
14
I am primarily interested in how peer recognition systems affect employees’
willingness to make costly sacrifices to help others. While in practice there are likely a
variety of alternative activities employees might engage in instead of helping (e.g., slack
time, additional time on their own work, etc.), these alternatives are of less interest to me.
I therefore assume a setting where the firm will always benefit from greater helping, and
impose a financial cost to helping to proxy for a number of appealing alternatives that
employees may experience in practice.
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help is given, then the potential helper is never identified.15 All participants also know
that there is the possibility that someone else in the room could help them, but that they
will only know who after the task is over and if that person chose to help them. If no help
was given, then participants are told they received no help and nothing else after the task
is over. Participants know that the person they have the opportunity to help is not the
same person who could help them. I make this clear to rule out typical direct reciprocity
concerns and to ensure that my manipulation is indeed influencing expectations of help
generally.
Experimental overview
Upon arrival, participants are greeted and handed a card with their seat
assignment. The card is color-coded and corresponds to their color division as discussed
later on. After participants find their seats, each color group takes a turn standing and
introducing themselves to the other participants in the room. Specifically, every
individual in each group would say, “Hello, I’m participant [#] from the [color] group.”
Participants are then read instructions while they follow along on computer monitors.
Instructions explain the data entry task and contain the peer recognition system
manipulation as described later. Participants must then correctly answer each question of
a comprehension quiz.
Next, participants complete the data entry task. Upon completion of the data entry
task, participants complete process measures before being informed if (and if so how

15

I make this design choice because in practice, if a potential helper does not wish to
engage in helping behaviors, they are often able to credibly deny their ability or capacity
to do so. Making participants anonymous unless help is given proxies for this credible
deniability (i.e., everyone knows someone else could help them, but they do not know
who).
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much) they were helped during the data entry task. Participants then make a recognition
choice if they are in one of the peer recognition conditions and received help. All
participants then complete additional post experimental questions and recognized
individuals receive an onscreen recognition message (and choose a reward, if applicable).
Finally, participants are informed of their final payment. Actual payments come in the
form of an Amazon e-gift card. Sessions took about 30 minutes to complete. I summarize
the experimental flow in Figure 3.1.
Manipulations
Group affiliation
I manipulate group affiliation using color groups (Towry, 2003). Color groups
might generalize to different divisions in a company (e.g., marketing, finance,
accounting, etc.) or to different skillsets or training backgrounds. I use color groups to
manipulate group affiliation to avoid introducing other contextual elements that could
limit the generalizability of my results, thereby allowing me to speak to a variety of
settings where in-group or out-group associations exist. The lab is divided into four colorcoded areas. Four participants make up each color group and they sit at computers in the
same quadrant throughout the experiment. During the task, immediately before
participants choose how much time they will allocate to helping another participant, they
are told specifically whom they could help. In the in-group (out-group) conditions,
participants have the opportunity to help someone from their own (a different) color
group. Specifically, in the in-group conditions participants are told that they have the
opportunity to help “participant [ID#], from your own, [color] group.” In the out-group
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conditions, participants are informed that they have the opportunity to help “participant
[ID#], from the [color] group.”16
Peer recognition
Peer recognition is manipulated in the instructions after participants are informed
that they will have the opportunity to help another participant in the room. Participants in
peer recognition conditions read the following:
To promote helping, there is a peer recognition system in place. Near the end of
the experiment, individuals who feel like they were helped in a significant way
will have the opportunity to choose to recognize the person who helped them by
sending an electronic message of thanks to them.17,18

In the no peer recognition conditions there is no mention of an opportunity to be
thanked by their peers.
Peer recognition with rewards
Participants in the peer recognition with rewards conditions receive the same
instructions as participants in the peer recognition conditions with the addition that they
are also told, “if you are recognized you will be able to choose a reward from the
following reward options.” The instructions contain pictures of the following five reward

16

The underlined text in these manipulation phrases is also highlighted in the group color
of the participant they could help for emphasis.
17
In practice, peer recognition systems are often framed to promote a positive culture,
including helping behavior (Jones, 2015; Quinn, 2018; Zappos Insights, 2012), thus
presenting the system as a means “to promote helping” is consistent with practice.
Further, as discussed below, the results do not suggest that my findings are simply the
outcome of a demand effect.
18
In practice, employees are often allowed (and encouraged) to write personalized notes
to peers they recognize. For simplicity, I hold recognition message content fixed. All
recognition messages read as follows: “Participant [ID#] would like to thank and
recognize you. Thank you for spending time to help me!” Participants do not know the
exact message content unless (and until) they receive it.
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options: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, M&M’s
candy, and Twix candy bar. Although participants are not told the dollar value of the
items, I purchased all of the items for less than $0.90 each.
Dependent variable
My primary dependent variable is the amount of time participants chose to spend
helping another participant. Other process and attention check variables are also
collected.
Participants
I recruited 192 undergraduate students from core accounting classes at a large
public university to participate in my study. Average age is 19, and 49 percent of
participants are female. Undergraduate students are appropriate to participate in this study
given that I use an abstract task that requires no specialized knowledge or skills (Libby et
al., 2002). Participants are given course credit in return for their participation and are paid
variable amounts depending on their own, and other participants’ choices during the
experiment as explained above. Average earnings were $7.56, with the minimum being
$5.00 and $12.85 being the highest earnings.
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Participants arrive and are
assigned to a color group
Instructions (including peer
recognition manipulation)
Complete data entry task for
6 minutes
Participants informed ID# and group of
person they could help (either own
group or a different group)
Participants choose how much
time to spend helping vs. working
for themselves (primary DV)
Complete data entry task for 4
minutes (time is split according
to participant’s choice above)

Complete process measures
Participants told if (and how much)
someone helped them and make
recognition choice (if applicable)
Complete additional postexperimental questions
Receive recognition message
(if applicable)
Experimental wrap-up

Figure 3.1 Experimental Flow
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Preliminary tests and descriptive statistics
To assess whether participants paid attention to my group affiliation
manipulation, I ask participants to recall whether the participant they had the opportunity
to help was in their own color group or a different color group. 92.7% of participants
correctly responded to this question according to their condition, suggesting that
participants paid attention to this manipulation.19 Note that participants in peer
recognition conditions are required to correctly acknowledge their understanding of the
system in the comprehension quiz prior to completing the task, and thus I do not include
a separate check for this manipulation.
Means for the time spent helping are displayed in Table 4.1, and are graphically
displayed in Figure 4.1. As shown, the means suggest a pattern consistent with my
hypotheses. Namely, it appears that helping is generally higher when a peer recognition
system is present versus absent (Hypothesis 1a), that a peer recognition system (absent
rewards) leads to a greater increase in in-group versus out-group helping (Hypothesis 2),

19

In the analyses presented hereafter, I include all participants. Results for my main
hypotheses tests related to group affiliation (i.e., hypotheses 2 and 3) are either
inferentially identical, or in some noted cases, become slightly more significant if I
exclude participants who did not correctly respond to this question.
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and that adding rewards leads to a greater increase in out-group versus in-group helping
(Hypothesis 3).20
Time spent helping is measured on a five-point scale from which participants
could choose to (1) spend no time helping, (i.e., 0 seconds), (2) spend one minute (60
seconds) helping, (3) spend two minutes (120 seconds) or half their time helping, (4)
spend three minutes (180 seconds) helping, or (5) spend the full four minutes (240
seconds) helping. The distribution of the total number of participants making each choice
is displayed in Figure 4.2, Panel A (and by condition in Figure 4.2, Panel B).
As shown in Figure 4.2, the data is not normally distributed and a Shapiro-Wilk
Test confirms this (p < 0.001). As such, tests that require a normality assumption (e.g.,
ANOVA or linear regression) are not optimal. Instead, I test my hypotheses in two
different ways. My primary interest is in in how my manipulations influence helping to
be relatively higher or relatively lower and while a median split lacks nuance, it does
capture this important element. Accordingly, I first test whether the probability that a
participant gave at least half of their time to help the other participant (which roughly
approximates a median split) varies in a manner consistent with my predicted pattern. I
then follow up this analysis and provide addition insights into how my manipulations are
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As suggested by Figure 4.1, I do not find that helping behavior was higher in the ingroup versus out-group condition when no peer recognition system was present.
Importantly, this does not prevent me from testing my hypothesized interactions, or
related theory suggesting that peer recognition systems strengthen in-group team identity.
While prior research might imply a main effect would also be present, a possible reason it
did not manifest could be that I used a relatively weak form of group affiliation
manipulation. For example, my participants never independently communicate, nor do
they work with their group members, either on their primary task, or on a team building
task (see Kachelmeier & Van Landuyt, 2017 and King, 2002 for examples of similar but
potentially stronger manipulations).
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influencing behavior across the full range of choices (i.e., did they lead participants to
help versus not help, or influence the amount of help they gave given that they helped).
As shown in Figure 4.2, participants did not view all helping choices the same,
and the majority of participants (55.2%) gave either no help (33.9%) or the minimum
help (22.4%), while the remaining participants (44.8%) gave half of their time or more. I
therefore categorize those who gave half of their time or more as “high helpers” and
those who gave less than this as “low helpers.” The percentage of “high helpers” by
condition is shown in Figure 4.3. I now proceed to test whether the likelihood of being a
“high helper” varies as hypothesized, using binary logistic regression.
Hypotheses tests
Hypothesis 1a predicts that employee helping behavior will be greater when a
peer recognition system is present than when it is absent. Table 4.2 presents results
related to this hypothesis. As shown in Panel B, participants are significantly more likely
to be a “high helper” when a recognition system is present (including with rewards)
versus absent (Wald = 3.02; p = 0.041, one-tailed), with the percent of “high helpers”
when no peer recognition system is present being 35.9% and the percent of “high
helpers” when a peer recognition system is present being 49.2% (see Table 4.2, Panel A).
This supports Hypothesis 1a.
Hypothesis 1b predicts that employee expectations of receiving help will mediate
the relation between a peer recognition system and employee helping behavior. To assess
participants’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of receiving help, I ask them the following
question (prior to them knowing how much help they actually received): “How likely do
you think it is that you were helped by someone else during the additional time?”
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Responses are provided on a seven-point scale with endpoints 1 = Very unlikely, and 7 =
Very likely. As shown in Panel A of Table 4.2, results reveal that participants believe the
likelihood of receiving help is significantly higher when a peer recognition system is
present (combined average of the peer recognition and peer recognition with rewards
conditions = 3.35) than when it is absent (average in the no peer recognition conditions =
2.71) and this difference is statistically significant (t = 3.01; p = 0.002, one-tailed). To
formally test the mediation effect predicted in Hypothesis 1b, I use PROCESS (Hayes,
2013) with 5,000 bootstrapped samples. Figure 4.4 presents the results of the mediation
model. As shown in Figure 4.4, the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect of peer
recognition systems on the likelihood of being a “high helper” through perceived
likelihood of being helped is entirely above zero (lower bound = 0.17; upper bound =
0.83) supporting the mediation effect predicted in Hypothesis 1b.21
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the increase in employee helping behavior caused by a
peer recognition system (absent rewards) will be greater when helping is in-group as
opposed to out-group.22 This suggests an interaction between group affiliation and the
presence/absence of a peer recognition system (while excluding rewards). To test this

Note that as shown in Figure 4.4 the direct effect (as denoted by C’), which is the effect
of peer recognition systems on the likelihood of being a “high helper” while controlling
for perceived likelihood of being helped is not significant. This suggests that, as discussed
in the theory section, any effect due to the peer recognition system directly signaling that
the firm wants helping behavior is not significant when taking into account the indirect
effect the system has on employees’ beliefs regarding the likelihood of receiving help.
22
To control for associations participants might have had outside of the laboratory, I
asked participants to indicate their agreement to the following two questions: “BEFORE
entering the experiment I knew the person I had the opportunity to help during today’s
study?” and “How likely do you believe you are to interact in the future with the person
that you had the opportunity to help?” Interaction results reported here for Hypothesis 2
and Hypothesis 3 are robust to controlling for these two questions.
21
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hypothesis, I run a binary logistical regression with “high helper” as the dependent
variable and group affiliation, peer recognition system (present/absent), and the
interaction term as independent variables. Results are presented in Table 4.3, Panel A. As
shown, the interaction term is significant (Wald = 3.74; p = 0.027, one-tailed), supporting
Hypothesis 2. Follow up analyses in Panel B show that the presence (versus absence) of a
peer recognition system has a significant positive effect on in-group helping (Wald =
4.93; p = 0.013, one-tailed), but not on out-group helping (Wald = 0.28; p = 0.599, twotailed).
My theory suggests that absent rewards tied to peer recognition, a peer
recognition system will have a greater effect on helping behavior among in-group (versus
out-group) members because it enhances the sense of team identity these individuals feel
toward one another. Similar to Towry (2003), I measure participants’ sense of team
identity using the following question: “To what extent do you view the person you had
the opportunity to help as a teammate?” Responses are provided on a seven-point scale
with endpoints 1 = “Not at all,” and 7 = “Very much.” Mean responses to this question by
condition are graphically displayed in Figure 4.5.
As predicted by my theory, among individuals who share an in-group status, a
peer recognition system (absent rewards) leads to a significant increase in the sense of
team identity participants feel (untabulated; t = 1.89; p = 0.032, one-tailed). Further, this
increase in team identification mediates the relation between a peer recognition system
(absent rewards) and the likelihood of being a “high helper” among in-group members
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(untabulated; lower bound = 0.03, upper bound = 0.99).23 Conversely, the presence of a
peer recognition system does not significantly increase team identification for out-group
members (untabulated; t = 0.38; p = 0.706, two-tailed).
Hypothesis 3 predicts that adding rewards to a peer recognition system will be
more beneficial for out-group helping than in-group helping. This suggests an interaction
between group affiliation and the presence/absence of rewards within a peer recognition
system. To test this hypothesis, I run a binary logistical regression with “high helper” as
the dependent variable and group affiliation, rewards (present/absent), and the interaction
term as independent variables. Results are presented in Table 4.4, Panel A. As shown, the
interaction term is significant (Wald = 2.61; p = 0.054, one-tailed), supporting
Hypothesis 3.24 Follow up analyses in Panel B show that adding rewards to a peer
recognition system has a positive effect on out-group helping (Wald = 2.30; p = 0.065,
one-tailed), but not on in-group helping (Wald = 0.58; p = 0.448, two-tailed).
These findings are consistent with my theory, which suggests that social
motivation and rewards act as substitutes, and that adding rewards to a peer recognition

In addition to measuring participants’ feelings of team identity, I also asked
participants to indicate their agreement/disagreement to four statements intended to
assess the degree to which they were concerned about the social approval of the person
they could help. The four statements were: (1) I thought a lot about what that person
might think of me. (2) I was concerned about the approval of that person. (3) I thought a
lot about what that person’s opinion of me would be. (4) I was concerned about that
person’s impression of me. When I combine these four questions into a single factor
score I find that it does not mediate the relation between a peer recognition system and
the likelihood of being a “high helper” regardless of whether participants share an ingroup status or not. This suggests that it is the team identity participants feel and not
concerns for social approval that are driving the increase in helping behavior when no
rewards are present and participants share an in-group status.
24
If participants who failed to correctly identify that the participant they could help
was/was not in their color group are dropped, this result becomes more significant
(untabulated; 2 = 3.75; p = 0.027, one-tailed).
23
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system is more effective for out-group versus in-group helping because in the out-group
case there is less substitution of social motivation taking place. Also consistent with this
theory, I find that, although the presence of a peer recognition (absent rewards) led to a
significant increase in the sense of team identity in-group members feel (relative to when
no peer recognition system is present, as reported above), this increase is no longer
significant when rewards are added to the system (untabulated; t = 1.12; p = 0.266, twotailed) (see Figure 4.5). I also find that rewards have no significant effect on the sense of
team identity felt by out-group members (untabulated; t = 0.09; p = 0.932, two-tailed).
This is also consistent with my theory that the reward incentive (and not a sense of team
identity) is driving the increase in helping behavior among out-group participants.
Alternative test of hypotheses: no help versus some help
In this section, I analyze how my manipulations influenced whether a participant
chose to help versus not help at all, and in the following section, I analyze the amount of
help chosen, given that a participant chose to help. Using a binary dependent variable
coded as 1 if a participant chose to help (regardless of the amount) and 0 if they did not
help at all (i.e., they used the full 4 minutes to work for themselves), I find support for
Hypothesis 1a (Wald = 2.95; p = 0.043, one-tailed). Further, Hypothesis 1b is also
supported using this dependent variable (95% confidence interval: lower bound = 0.31;
upper bound = 1.48). This suggests that the presence (versus absence) of a peer
recognition system led participants to be more likely to help and that their perceived
likelihood of being helped explains this effect.
I next test whether Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are supported using this
dependent variable, but find that they are not (Hypothesis 2, p = 0.405 and Hypothesis 3,
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p = 0.491). As such, I cannot assert that the probability of helping some versus not at all
is influenced by my varables in the interactive ways that I hypothesized.
Alternative test of hypotheses: Amount of help, given a participant chose to help
In this section I test whether the amount of help participants chose to provide,
given that they chose to help (i.e., time helping > 0), varies in a manner consistent with
my predictions using ordinal logistic regression. I first test whether participants provide
more help when a peer recognition system is present versus absent (Hypothesis 1a), but
do not find support that they do (Wald = 1.02; p = 0.157, one-tailed). Similarly,
Hypothesis 1b is not supported. Given this combined with my prior analysis, it appears
that the general presence versus absence of a peer recognition system primarily
influences whether help is given (versus not), but not how much help is given.
I next test Hypothesis 2 that a peer recognition system will have a greater positive
effect on in-group versus out-group helping and find marginal support for the predicted
interaction (Wald = 1.78; p = 0.091, one-tailed). I also test Hypothesis 3 that adding
rewards to a peer recognition system will have a greater positive effect on out-group
helping than in-group helping and again find marginal support for the predicted
interaction (Wald = 2.34; p = 0.063, one-tailed).
While the analysis presented in the prior paragraph does provide marginal support
for my predicted interactions, the results do not fully match those reported earlier using
the median split. As such, I conduct additional analysis to provide further insights.
Specifically, it is possible that certain types of individuals may choose to always help,
regardless of whether or not (or what type of) a peer recognition system is in place. If this
is the case, these individuals may be clouding my ability to detect my predicted effects

31

among those participants who are receptive to peer recognition systems. As shown in
Table 4.1, the percent of participants who helped the maximum of 240 seconds (i.e., gave
all their time to help) ranges from 6.3% - 21.9%. A chi-square test however, does not find
that the probability of helping the maximum varies across my six experimental conditions
(untabulated; 2 = 4.85; p = 0.434, two-tailed). This suggests that the proportion of
participants at the maximum of the helping range does not significantly vary based on the
presence (or type) of peer recognition system (or group affiliation for that matter).25
Given this, I proceed to test whether the interactions predicted in Hypotheses 2
and 3 manifest among participants in the middle of the range (i.e., who did not chose to
help for 0 or 240 seconds). I first test Hypothesis 2, which predicts that peer recognition
systems (absent rewards) will be more effective in motivating in-group versus out-group
helping. Results from the ordinal logistic regression reveal a highly significant interaction
(untabulated; Wald = 7.40; p = 0.004, one-tailed). Hypothesis 3 predicts that adding
rewards to a peer recognition system will be more beneficial for out-group versus ingroup helping. Results from the ordinal logistic regression again reveal a highly
significant interaction (untabulated; Wald = 8.33; p = 0.002, one-tailed).26

25

This result is akin to findings reported in the honesty literature (e.g., Evans et al., 2001)
which find that some individuals always prefer to be honest regardless of their condition.
I also find some evidence that these individuals are unique demographically. Specifically,
there were less non-native English speakers who helped the maximum relative to those
who chose other (non-zero) helping choices (2 = 3.07; p = 0.080, two-tailed).
Accordingly, it is possible that cultural differences were associated with the helping
choices of these individuals.
26
Results reported in this paragraph for Hypotheses 2 and 3 are inferentially identical if I
use linear regression instead of ordinal logistic regression.
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Discussion of results
While my analyses suggest that my results are subject to limitations, I also believe
that I have provided relevant findings that support my theory. I first presented evidence
that my theory is effective in predicting the likelihood that a participant will be a
relatively “high helper.” I defined “high helpers” as those who gave at least half of their
time to help the other participant. I believe that this analysis provides relevant and
generalizable inferences, as it captures whether participants helped relatively more or
relatively less. I then conducted alternative tests in which I analyzed participants’ choices
to help versus not, and the amount of help given, assuming that they did help. These
analyses revealed three additional takeaways. First, they suggest that the presence (versus
absence) of a peer recognition system appears to be a primary driver in leading more
individuals to help (versus not). Second, they suggest that certain types of individuals
may not respond to peer recognition systems. This may be informative for firms
contemplating implementing a peer recognition system. For example, if the firm believes
that a large number of their employees fall into this category, a peer recognition system
may be less effective for them. And third, importantly, I do find that my theory is
predictive of behavior among individuals in the middle of the helping range. Thus,
although my theory may not apply to every employee, it does appear to apply to a
significant group of employees. Taken together, I believe I provide compelling findings
in support of my theoretical predictions.
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Count of participants making each time spent helping choice, as well as mean time (standard deviations) for each condition
Seconds helping:
No peer recognition

n

0
14

60
6

120
8

43.8% 18.8% 25.0%
Outgroup

Peer recognition

n

10

12

4

31.3% 37.5% 12.5%
Peer recognition with rewards

n

11

5

7
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34.4% 15.6% 21.9%
No peer recognition

n

13

8

7

40.6% 25.0% 21.9%
In-group

Peer recognition

n

8

4

14

180
0

240
4

Total
32

Mean
(s.d.)
71.25

0.0%

12.5%

100%

(81.27)

0

6

32

82.50

0.0%

18.8%

100%

(85.87)

2

7

32

99.38

6.3%

21.9%

100%

(93.46)

1

3

32

69.38

3.1%

9.4%

100%

(76.37)

4

2

32

97.50

6.3%

100%

(71.07)

0

6

32

97.50

0.0%
7

18.8%
28

100%
192

(84.51)
86.25

25.0% 12.5% 43.8% 12.5%
Peer recognition with rewards

Total

n

N

9

6

11

28.1% 18.8% 34.4%
65
41
51

Table 4.1 (Cont.)
Notes to Table 4.1:
- Time spent helping is measured as the amount of time (in seconds) that participants chose to spend helping the other participant.
Participants could choose to spend 0 seconds, 60 seconds, 120 seconds, 180 seconds, or 240 seconds.
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or an opportunity to be recognized by a peer.
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they could be
recognized and thanked if they choose to help.
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer recognition
condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options were the
following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, M&M’s, and Twix candy bar.
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color group than the helping participant.
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as the helping participant.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics and tests for Hypothesis 1a
Panel A: Descriptive statistics: percent of “high helpers” by condition and mean
(standard deviation) perceived likelihood of receiving help by condition

Percent “high helpers”

No peer recognition
conditions
35.9%
n = 64

All peer recognition
present conditions
49.2%
n = 128

2.71
(1.28)
n = 64

3.35
(1.44)
n = 128

Perceived likelihood of
receiving help

Panel B: Effect of a peer recognition system on likelihood of being a “high helper” and
perceived likelihood of receiving help
Test statistic
p-value
“High helpers”
No peer recognition system
Wald =3.02
0.041*
vs
All peer recognition present conditions
t = 3.01
Perceived likelihood of receiving help
No peer recognition system
vs
All peer recognition present conditions
* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect.

0.002*

Notes to Table 4.2:
-High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or less
helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.
-Perceived likelihood of receiving help: represents the average response to the following
question: “How likely do you think it is that you were helped by someone else during the
additional time?” (responses were on a seven point scale anchored at 1 = “Very unlikely,”
and 7 = “Very likely”).
-In the no peer recognition conditions, there is no mention of a peer recognition system
or an opportunity to be recognized by a peer.
-All peer recognition present conditions consist of the peer recognition conditions and the
peer recognition with rewards conditions. In the peer recognition conditions, participants
are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they could be
recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the peer recognition with rewards
conditions, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer
recognition condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small
reward if they are recognized.
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Table 4.3 Tests for Hypothesis 2
Panel A: Test for Hypothesis 2, interaction between group affiliation and the
presence/absence of a peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a “high helper”
Wald 2

df

p-value

Group affiliation

2.46

1

0.117

Peer recognition present/absent

1.41

1

0.236

Group affiliation * Peer recognition

3.74

1

0.027*

Binary Logistic Regression Output

* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect.
Panel B: Follow up analyses for Hypothesis 2, effect of a peer recognition system on ingroup and out-group likelihood of being a “high helper”
Wald 2

p-value

Presence versus absence of peer
recognition system when:
In-group

4.93

0.013*

Out-group

0.28

0.599

* Presented p-value is one-tailed
Notes to Table 4.3:
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.
-Group affiliation is a binary variable that equals 1 if in-group and 0 if out-group. In the
in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as
the helping participant. In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is
from a different color group than the helping participant.
-Peer recognition present/absent is a binary variable that equal 1 for the peer recognition
condition and 0 for the no peer recognition condition. In the peer recognition condition,
participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they
could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the no peer recognition
condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or an opportunity to be
recognized by a peer.
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Table 4.4 Tests for Hypothesis 3
Panel A: Test for Hypothesis 3, interaction between group affiliation and the
presence/absence of rewards on the likelihood of being a “high helper”
Wald 2

df

p-value

Group affiliation

3.83

1

0.050

Rewards present/absent

0.31

1

0.580

Group affiliation * Rewards

2.61

1

0.054*

Binary Logistic Regression Output

* Presented p-value is one-tailed for predicted effect.
Panel B: Follow up analyses for Hypothesis 3, effect of rewards on in-group and outgroup likelihood of being a “high helper”
Wald 2

p-value

Presence versus absence of rewards
within peer recognition
In-group

0.58

0.448

Out-group

2.30

0.065*

* Presented p-value is one-tailed
Notes to Table 4.1:
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.
-Group affiliation is a binary variable that equals 1 if in-group and 0 if out-group. In the
in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color group as
the helping participant. In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is
from a different color group than the helping participant.
- Rewards present/absent is a binary variable that equals 1 if peer recognition with
rewards condition and 0 if peer recognition condition. In the peer recognition condition,
participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system present and that they
could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help. In the peer recognition with
rewards condition, participants receive the same manipulation as participants in the peer
recognition condition but are also informed that they will be allowed to choose a small
reward if they are recognized. The reward options were the following: stress ball, pencil
(with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar, M&M’s, and Twix candy bar.
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100

Time spent helping

95
90
85
80
75
70
65

No peer recognition

Peer recognition
Out-group

Peer recognition with rewards

In-group

Figure 4.1 Pattern of means for helping behavior by condition
Notes to Figure 4.1:
-Time spent helping is measured as the amount of time (in seconds) that participants
chose to spend helping the other participant. Participants could choose to spend between
zero and four minutes helping, in one minute increments.
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer.
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose
to help.
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar,
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar.
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color
group than the helping participant.
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color
group as the helping participant.
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Figure 4.2 Number of participants choosing each amount of time to help
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Figure 4.3 Percentage of participants who were “high helpers” by condition
Notes to Figure 4.3:
- High helper is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer.
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose
to help.
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar,
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar.
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color
group than the helping participant.
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color
group as the helping participant.
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A = 0.64
(p = 0.001)

Peer recognition
system (present vs.
absent)

Perceived
likelihood of
receiving help

B = 0.70
(p < 0.001)

C = 0.55
(p = 0.041)

“High helper”

C’ = 0.19
(p = 0.592)

Confidence interval for the indirect effect of a peer recognition system on time helping
through perceived likelihood of being helped:
Lower Bound Upper Bound

Indirect Effect

0.17

0.83*

* Presented confidence interval is based on a 95% confidence level.
Figure 4.4 Test of Hypothesis 1b: Mediation analysis
Notes to figure 4.4:
-Bolded tests are one-tailed.
-Peer recognition present (includes both the peer recognition and peer recognition with
rewards conditions): Participants are informed that there is a peer recognition system
present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose to help.
-Perceived likelihood of receiving help: represents the average response to the
following question: “How likely do you think it is that you were helped by someone
else during the additional time?” (responses were on a seven point scale anchored at 1
= “Very unlikely,” and 7 = “Very likely”).
-High helper: is a binary variable which equals 0 if the participant spent 60 seconds or
less helping and 1 if the participant spent 120 seconds or more helping.
-Process uses binary logistic regression when assessing links with a binary dependent
variable.
-C represents the total effect of a Peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a
“high helper” without considering the effect of the mediating variable. C’ represents
the direct effect of a Peer recognition system on the likelihood of being a “high helper”
when including the effect of the mediating variable.
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4.3

Team Identification

4.1
3.9
3.7
3.5
3.3
3.1
2.9
No peer recognition

Peer recognition
Out-group

Peer recognition with rewards

In-group

Figure 4.5 Plot of means for the sense of team identity participants feel in relation to the
person they could help by condition
Notes to Figure 4.5:
-Team identity is measured by participant’s responses to the following question: “To what
extent do you view the person you had the opportunity to help as a teammate?”
Responses are given on a seven point scale with endpoints 1 = “Not at all” and 7 = “Very
much.”
-In the no peer recognition condition, there is no mention of a peer recognition system or
an opportunity to be recognized by a peer.
-In the peer recognition condition, participants are informed that there is a peer
recognition system present and that they could be recognized and thanked if they choose
to help.
-In the peer recognition with rewards condition, participants receive the same
manipulation as participants in the peer recognition condition but are also informed that
they will be allowed to choose a small reward if they are recognized. The reward options
were the following: stress ball, pencil (with school insignia on it), Snickers candy bar,
M&M’s, and Twix candy bar.
-In the out-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from a different color
group than the helping participant.
-In the in-group condition, the participant that could be helped is from the same color
group as the helping participant.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This study finds that group affiliation is an important factor to consider when
designing peer recognition systems and provides insights for managers regarding when
tying rewards to peer recognition is likely to be most beneficial. In so doing, this study
provides valuable insights for managerial accountants who have responsibility over
incentive, control, and performance management systems (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002;
IMA, 2019). This study suggests that firms should consider the nature of the social
environment and group affiliations of their employees when deciding what type of peer
recognition system to implement. For example, if a firm wishes to encourage greater
helping behavior across groups, tying rewards to the peer recognition may be particularly
useful for them. Alternatively, if a firm is able to strengthen the degree to which
employees view themselves as being part of the same group, my results suggest that tying
rewards to peer recognition provides little incremental benefit.
This study also adds to the motivation literature by considering the effects of peer
recognition systems. Research has recently begun to examine the effects of recognition
from superiors on employee effort to complete their own work (Bradler et al., 2014;
Burke, 2019; Burke et al., 2019; Wang, 2017), but has not yet considered the effects of
recognition from peers on helping behaviors. This paper provides an initial exploration
into the effects of peer recognition systems on helping behavior, and suggests that group
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affiliation and the addition of rewards are important factors to consider in understanding
the effects of peer recognition systems.
This study is subject to limitations that offer possibilities for future research.
While the business press tends to suggest that most firms are using too little, rather than
too much recognition (e.g., Gallup, 2016; Motivosity, 2016; Nelson, 2012), it is possible
that excessive amounts of recognition (including from peers) could cheapen the perceived
value of being recognized and lead these systems to become ineffective. Further, the
design of my study would seem to best speak to settings in which informal peer
recognition is mostly absent, or generally ineffective. If companies already have highly
effective informal recognition cultures in place, then the effect of adding a formal peer
recognition system could be less (or more) positive than what is documented here. Future
research may wish to consider these possibilities. In my experiment, I control for
reputation and strategic effects by limiting interactions to a single period. This design
choice allows me to cleanly test my theoretical explanations; however, future research
might consider the effects of peer recognition in a multi-period setting. Considering
multiple periods could clarify how being recognized (or not) influences helping behavior
in future periods.
In my study, I assume that the firm wants helping behavior, and that within the
possible range, more helping is better; however there likely exist settings where this is
not the case. Future research could consider whether peer recognition systems might lead
to excessive amounts of helping (e.g., at the expense of employees’ own work) and
whether different modifications to those systems might encourage more optimal amounts
of helping. Further, in addition to helping behavior, firms likely wish to capture multiple
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benefits from implementing peer recognition programs (e.g., better individual
performance, employee satisfaction, reduced turnover, etc.). The effect of peer
recognition systems on other dependent variables could be an interesting area for future
research. In addition, future research might consider the effect of varying the frequency
of peer recognition or the degree of personalization of recognition messages. Future
research might also consider costs and benefits of varying the value of rewards associated
with peer recognition.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPT FROM EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT
The experimenter read the following instructions, while participants followed along on
computer monitors.
Your task today is to input hypothetical customer numbers into the computer. An
example is shown below:

Name
Bob Martino
Sam Smith
Lydia Wright
Melinda Crapo
Hank Nelson

Customer Number
652331
624409
851612
622243
319882

Name: Sam Smith
Customer Number:

If you were given this example you would need to type by hand (you will not be able to
copy and paste) “624409” into the customer number box for Sam Smith which is shown
above. There will be many such entries to complete and you can access more entries by
scrolling down the page. Once you input the number you can proceed to the next entry—
you do not have to press enter.
While completing the actual task all participants saw the same customer listings in the
same order. Only entries that were input correctly were counted, however as discussed in
the body of the paper, my primary dependent variable is the amount of time participants
spent helping (not the number of entries they completed).
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